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ABSTRACT 
  Thorough patent examination ensures that issued patents confer 
constitutionally granted incentives to innovate but do not create 
inappropriately broad monopolies. Examiners at the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office are alone tasked with striking this 
proper balance, in part by searching the universe of existing published 
knowledge to determine the originality of the applied-for invention. 
  In 2011, Congress enacted the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 
which included a provision allowing the public to present examiners 
with relevant publications that the examiners’ own searches might not 
otherwise uncover. However, this “preissuance submissions” 
provision and its related administrative rule are tempered by 35 
U.S.C. § 122(c) (2006), which prohibits any third-party, pre-grant 
“protest or other form of [preissuance] opposition” to an application. 
Thus, although a party may describe to an examiner how its 
submission is relevant to an application, that party is prohibited from 
arguing how the submission renders that application unpatentable. 
  This Note argues that Congress should amend § 122(c) to permit 
preissuance third-party argumentation for two reasons. First, the 
current scheme arguably violates that law already. Second, a rule 
allowing submitter argumentation would better incentivize 
participation by competitive parties who fear that examiners might not 
recognize their submitted publications’ full invalidating potential. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Taboo, the game of “unspeakable fun” and popular variation on 
the classic game of charades, invites one player to verbally suggest to 
his teammates a word or phrase printed on each game card.1 The 
catch: that player may neither say the given word or phrase, nor say 
any of the commonly associated words or phrases that are also listed 
on the card.2 This rule forces participants to be creative and indirect 
in their communication under time pressure, for if the speaker utters 
any of the “taboo” words during his round, a buzzer sounds and his 
team loses points.3 
On September 16, 2012, the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (the Office) effected its latest variation on the game of Taboo,4 
although one much less common at family game night. In accord with 
the changes to patent prosecution procedure set forth in the Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act (the AIA),5 the Office’s 2012 regulations6 
permit the public to submit to the Office any patents or printed 
publications that bear upon the patentability of pending patent 
applications.7 Thus, in an effort to thwart a competitor’s pending 
application, a party may submit any printed publications that, alone 
 
 1. Milton Bradley Co., Taboo™ Instructions 2 (1989), available at http://www.hasbro.com/
common/instruct/Taboo_(1989).pdf. Taboo is different from the nonverbal game of charades 
because it allows verbal, and only verbal, communication. 
 2. Id. 
 3. To illustrate, consider a hypothetical game card displaying the words “Duke 
University” such that the cardholder’s object is to induce his teammates to guess those words 
aloud. Printed below “Duke University” would be commonly associated words such as “devils,” 
“Krzyzewski,” “Durham, North Carolina,” and “blue.” Because the cardholder is prohibited 
from communicating any of these words to his teammates, he might instead say, “It’s a college 
in the ACC, spouse of a duchess,” and so on. The buzzer possessor, a member from the 
opposing team, also reviews the card and monitors the speaker’s compliance with the word 
restrictions. Id. 
 4. Although the Office did not call its system Taboo, this Note outlines the similarities. 
 5. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be 
codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 28, 35, 42, and 51 U.S.C.). 
 6. Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties Provision of the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,150 (July 17, 2012) (to be codified at 37 
C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 7. See id. Preissuance submissions must be filed prior to either six months from the time 
the patent application is published on the Internet or the date of the examiner’s first rejection, 
whichever occurs later. Id. at 42,173. The Office has not limited the scope of permissible 
publications to prior art, id. at 42,161, which are existing patents or publications that bear on the 
originality of a proposed invention.  
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or in the aggregate, suggest that the application should be rejected on 
any of the various grounds for unpatentability.8 
Submitting parties are also required to describe how each 
submitted patent or publication is relevant to the target application.9 
The catch: like the speakers in the game of Taboo, third-party 
submitters are prohibited from directly revealing their suggested 
theories of unpatentability or directly arguing the merits of those 
theories.10 Instead, submitters must communicate only indirectly with 
the Office’s examiners,11 pointing them in a desired direction by 
providing strategically chosen publications and craftily worded 
descriptions of relevance. From these submissions, the examiners 
must independently derive their own arguments against patentability. 
If a submission does not comply with the Office’s restrictions, the 
metaphorical buzzer sounds, and the submission is discarded in its 
entirety.12 
The restriction on third-party arguments opposing patentability 
stems from 35 U.S.C. § 122(c), which bars any “protest or other form 
of pre-issuance opposition” to a pending application after the Office 
publishes that application.13 Almost immediately after Congress 
codified § 122(c) in 1999,14 the Office nonetheless created a limited 
avenue for third parties to assist examiners in locating publications 
relevant to any published application’s patentability.15 Building upon 
 
 8. A patent application may be rejected for many reasons. For example, the invention 
may encompass nonpatentable subject matter, see 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006 & Supp. V 2011), some 
of the claims may be indefinite or the application might fail to enable a person skilled in the art 
to recreate the invention, see 35 U.S.C. § 112, or the invention might be preempted or made 
obvious by earlier patents or other publications, see 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103. 
 9. Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties Provision of the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 42,173 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 
1.290(d)(2)). 
 10. See id. at 42,156 (“[The rule] is not an invitation to a third party to propose rejections of 
the claims or set forth arguments . . . .”); id. at 42,159 (“Unlike the concise description of 
relevance required . . . for a preissuance submission, the concise explanation for [a different 
procedure] allows for arguments against patentability.”). 
 11. See id. 
 12. See id. at 42,152 (“Third-party submissions that are not compliant with the statute will 
not be entered into the [image file wrapper] of an application or considered, and will be 
discarded.”). 
 13. 35 U.S.C. § 122(c) (2006). 
 14. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. 106-113, tit. IV, 113 Stat. 1501, 
1501A-552 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 122(c)). 
 15. See Changes To Implement Eighteen-Month Publication of Patent Applications, 65 
Fed. Reg. 57,024, 57,056 (Sept. 20, 2000) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). For further discussion of 
this limited avenue, see infra part I.B. 
TRZECIAK IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 9/18/2013  4:21 PM 
248 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:245 
the Office’s procedural innovation, Congress enacted the America 
Invents Act in 2011, including within it a provision greatly expanding 
the Office’s earlier procedure.16 
Pursuant to the AIA, the Office promulgated its current rule in 
2012.17 This rule requires third parties to include with each of their 
submitted documents “[a] concise description of the [document’s] 
asserted relevance” to the pending application,18 so long as that 
description does not amount to a rejection proposal or an argument 
against patentability.19 The AIA preissuance submissions provision 
and the ensuing Office rule have provided third parties more tools 
than ever to win the metaphorical game of Taboo and effectively 
oppose pending patent applications. 
Problematically, Congress left § 122(c) and its prohibition against 
pre-grant opposition fully intact. Congress’s inaction here results in 
two problems. First, particularly between the Office’s new 
preissuance submissions rule and § 122(c), there now exists significant 
tension in the law. Although the Office has responded with attempts 
to delineate a clear distinction between preissuance submissions and 
those actions that are prohibited by § 122(c), this Note argues that the 
distinction is not clear at all.20 Second, because of the limitations 
imposed by § 122(c), the preissuance submission rule provides 
inadequate incentives for competition-driven third parties to 
participate. Since an issued patent is presumed valid during 
litigation,21 it can be presumed to have overcome all references 
included within its application file. As a result of this post-issuance 
presumption, potential litigants are generally reluctant to contribute 
references to such a file because those references will have 
diminished value in the event of litigation.22 That reluctance is at a 
maximum when the rules prevent submitters’ clearest argumentation, 
thereby reducing the perceived likelihood that examiners will 
 
 16. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 8, 125 Stat. 284, 315 (2011) 
(to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 122(e)) (allowing submissions of any printed publications with 
accompanying descriptions of relevance). 
 17. See Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties Provision of 
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 42,173 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. 
§ 1.290). 
 18. Id. at 42,173 (to be codified at § 1.290(d)(2)). 
 19. Id. at 42,156. 
 20. See infra Part II.A. 
 21. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2006). 
 22. Salvador M. Bezos, Third-Party Submissions, in 2 PATENT OFFICE LITIGATION § 14:39 
(Robert Sterne et al. eds., 2012). 
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recognize and employ the submitted references’ full invalidating 
potential. 
Although Congress made great strides in amending the 
preissuance submissions procedure to allow greater public 
involvement in patent prosecution, this Note argues that it should 
take one additional small step to eliminate the legal tension between 
the Office’s new preissuance submissions rule and § 122(c) and to 
further boost participation of third parties.23 Congress should amend 
§ 122(c) to permit third parties to supplement their submitted 
references with direct arguments explaining not only how those 
references are relevant to a pending application, but also how they 
specifically render that application unpatentable.24 
This Note proceeds in two parts. Part I traces the evolution of 
the current preissuance submissions rule. To this end, subparts I.A 
and I.B outline the history of the Office’s prior programs providing 
for different levels of third-party participation in patent prosecution. 
Subpart I.C summarizes the legislative history of the AIA with 
respect to its preissuance submissions provision. Subpart I.D 
examines the Office’s rulemaking in response to the AIA, with 
particular emphasis on the Office’s justifications for the current rule. 
Part II advocates for further change in the law to provide greater 
third-party participation in patent prosecution. Subpart II.A argues 
that the Office’s current preissuance submission program is now so 
extensive that it already transgresses § 122(c)’s restriction against 
post-publication opposition. Finally, Subpart II.B proposes that 
Congress should further the policy objectives behind the AIA by 
amending § 122(c) to allow for third parties to supplement their 
submissions with direct arguments against patentability. 
I.  HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF PREISSUANCE THIRD-PARTY 
INVOLVEMENT 
A 1998 empirical study of three hundred patent-validity cases 
found that 46 percent of challenged patents had been held invalid.25 
Commentators have long lamented that the existence of so many 
“bad patents” has a detrimental effect on the economy and society as 
 
 23. See infra Part II. 
 24. See infra Part II. 
 25. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated 
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205–06 (1998). 
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a whole.26 For instance, validity disputes in court “impose litigation 
costs on society.”27 Also, owners of bad patents unjustly burden others 
with license fees.28 In addition, because litigation is a lengthy process 
that often costs millions of dollars,29 some licensees may opt to 
continue paying royalties in lieu of challenging bad patents in court.30 
Finally, technology firms may choose not to enter a given market if 
they find that competitors already hold overbroad patents in that 
market.31 
In an attempt to identify a potential source of the weaknesses in 
patent quality, some commentators have noted that Office examiners 
spend only about eighteen hours reviewing a given patent 
application.32 In that short time and among many other duties, each 
examiner must search the entire universe of technical information for 
invalidating prior art—existing patents or publications that either 
disclose all elements of the claimed invention or render the claimed 
invention obvious.33 One option for alleviating this heavy burden on 
the Office is to invite interested members of the public to provide 
examiners with prior art or other forms of assistance.34 The remainder 
of this Part discusses the various programs that the Office has 
 
 26. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 
1495, 1515–20 (2001) (discussing “the social costs of bad patents”); FED. TRADE COMM'N, TO 
PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND 
POLICY 5–6 (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (discussing 
“questionable patents”). 
 27. Lemley, supra note 26, at 1515; see also Doug Harvey, Comment, Reinventing the U.S. 
Patent System: A Discussion of Patent Reform Through an Analysis of the Proposed Patent 
Reform Act of 2005, 38 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1133, 1164 (2006) (“[L]itigation over the validity of a 
patent is costly and time-consuming.”). 
 28. Lemley, supra note 26, at 1515. 
 29. FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, supra note 26, at 6; see also Qin Shi, Reexamination, 
Opposition, or Litigation? Legislative Efforts To Create A Post-Grant Patent Quality Control 
System, 31 AIPLA Q.J. 433, 435 (2003). 
 30. Lemley, supra note 26, at 1515; Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives To 
Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why 
Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 954 (2004). 
 31. See Lemley, supra note 26, at 1515–16 (noting the potential of patents to deter 
competition). Professor Lemley also notes that, in practice, many companies do not actually 
search for others’ patents in an effort to avoid knowingly infringing upon those patents. Id. at 
1516. 
 32. See, e.g., Michael Meehan, Increasing Certainty and Harnessing Private Information in 
the U.S. Patent System: A Proposal for Reform, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, ¶ 80, 
http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/meehan-increasing-certainty. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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implemented to increasingly integrate third parties into patent 
prosecution. 
A. Evolution of the Protest 
In 1977, with the intention of both “improving the quality of 
issued patents” and “avoiding the issuance of invalid patents,” the 
Office promulgated a rule, 37 C.F.R. § 1.291 (Rule 291),35 which 
established a written protest procedure for third parties to challenge 
pending patent applications.36 In 1982, the Office clarified that 
protests “may include any grounds which the member of the public 
filing the protest believes to be applicable.”37 Among other 
requirements, protest submissions must include “(1) a listing of the 
patents, publications or other information relied upon; [and] (2) a 
concise explanation of the relevance of each listed item.”38 
Emphasizing the restrictive nature of the protest procedure, the 1982 
amendment provides that “the active participation of the member of 
the public filing a protest . . . ends with the filing of the protest.”39 
Until 2000, the Office kept pending patent applications 
confidential.40 Therefore, third parties were generally unaware of 
pending patent applications and rarely invoked the protest 
procedure.41 In the 1990s, however, several legislative efforts 
 
 35. Patent Examining and Appeal Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 5588, 5589 (Jan. 28, 1977) 
(codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.291 (1980)). 
 36. The Office had previously provided for a “public use proceeding,” a limited method for 
persons “having information of the pendency of an application” to demonstrate that an 
invention claimed in a pending application “had been in public use or on sale one year before 
the filing of the application.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.292 (1976). Because the public use proceeding was 
used infrequently, was rarely successful in leading to claim rejection, was a cause of prosecution 
delay, and became redundant to the protest procedure, the Office abandoned it in 2012. See 
Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties Provision of the Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,150, 42,151, 42,160 (July 17, 2012) (to be codified at 
37 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 37. Reissue, Reexamination, Protest and Examination Procedures in Patent Cases, 47 Fed. 
Reg. 21,746, 21,749 (May 19, 1982) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 38. Id. at 21,752. 
 39. Id.  
 40. See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (Supp. V 1999) (“Prior to amendment, text read as follows: 
‘Applications for patents shall be kept in confidence by the Patent and Trademark Office . . . .’” 
(quoting 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1994))). 
 41. Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward A Viable Administrative Revocation 
System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 16 (1997). However, protests were also 
allowed during postissuance, patentee-initiated “reissue” proceedings, which were made public. 
Patent Examining and Appeal Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 5588, 5589 (Jan. 28, 1977) (codified as 
amended at 37 C.F.R. § 1.291). 
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proposed that pending patent applications should be published and 
made available to the public.42 During a 1996 notice-and-comment 
rulemaking by the Office, several commenters raised concerns that 
protests could be abused as pre-grant opposition if applications were 
published.43 Opponents were concerned that such procedures would 
lead to delay of patent prosecution and harassment of patent 
applicants.44 Although the Office declined at that time to change its 
policies,45 Congress soon addressed the opponents’ concerns. 
The proposed Moorhead-Schroeder Patent Reform Act of 1996 
(the 1996 Act) included an amendment to § 122,46 providing that 
patent applications would be published eighteen months after their 
filing.47 To allay fears that publication would lead to delay, the 1996 
Act also mandated that the amendment could not be used “to create 
any new opportunity for pre-issuance or pre-grant opposition.”48 
While the 1996 Act was never passed, a third iteration of patent 
reform proposals, the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 
(the AIPA),49 was successfully enacted on November 29, 1999.50 As 
the previous legislative efforts had attempted, the AIPA amended 
§ 122 to provide for pre-grant publication of patent applications.51 
 
 42. See infra notes 46–51 and accompanying text. 
 43. See Miscellaneous Changes in Patent Practice, 61 Fed. Reg. 42,790, 42,799 (Aug. 19, 
1996) (codified as amended at 35 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 44. Cf. Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks To Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 763, 783 (2002) (“For example, large companies with ample resources may choose to 
stall the issuance of patents by small inventors.”). The Japanese Patent Office at one time 
allowed third parties to initiate “slow moving” pre-grant opposition proceedings, but it 
eliminated that procedure in the mid-1990s pursuant to an agreement with the United States. Sri 
Krishna Sankaran, Patent Flooding in the United States and Japan, 40 IDEA 393, 405–07 (2000). 
Unlike this Note’s proposed system, which would allow mere submissions of prior art and 
accompanying argumentation, the more formal Japanese oppositions required examiners to 
individually decide upon and respond to each opposition. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
GAO/GGD-93-126, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: U.S. COMPANIES’ PATENT 
EXPERIENCES IN JAPAN 32–33 (1993). The Japanese process often delayed issuance for up to 
five years. Id. at 33. 
 45. See Miscellaneous Changes in Patent Practice, 61 Fed. Reg. at 42,800 (“Nevertheless, as 
neither H.R. 1732 nor H.R. 1733 has presently been enacted, analysis of whether modification 
of §1.291 . . . is desirable in a pre-grant publication or expanded reexamination system is held in 
abeyance pending enactment of H.R. 1733 or 1732.”). 
 46. Moorhead-Schroeder Patent Reform Act, H.R. 3460, 104th Cong. (1996). 
 47. Id. § 202. 
 48. Id. 
 49. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, tit. IV, 113 Stat. 1501, 
1501A-552 (1999) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 5, 6, 273, 297, 311–318). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. § 4502.  
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Importantly for the purposes of this Note, the AIPA also included an 
amendment to § 122(c), providing that “the Director shall establish 
appropriate procedures to ensure that no protest or other form of pre-
issuance opposition to the grant of a patent on an application may be 
initiated after publication of the application without the express 
written consent of the applicant.”52 
Accordingly, in September 2000, the Office amended the protest 
rules pursuant to the AIPA “to provide that a protest must be 
submitted prior to the date the application [is] published.”53 Because 
preissuance protests are permissible only before the Office informs 
the public of any given application, it is likely that they are rarely, if 
ever, employed.54 
B. Rule 99 Third-Party Submissions in Published Applications 
Despite the restriction in § 122(c) on preissuance protests and on 
any other form of pre-grant opposition,55 the Office invoked its 
procedural rulemaking power in 2000 to create a new avenue for 
third-party involvement in patent prosecution.56 Under the new 37 
C.F.R. § 1.99 (Rule 99), interested third parties could submit relevant 
prior art to a patent application file within a narrow two-month 
window beginning when that application was published.57 For each 
$180 payment,58 any member of the public could submit up to ten 
patents or publications to be entered into an application file and 
 
 52. Id. (emphasis added). 
 53. Changes To Implement Eighteen-Month Publication of Patent Applications, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 57,024, 57,038 (Sept. 20, 2000) (codified as amended at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 54. The Office does not release usage statistics for the protest procedure. Nonetheless, 
commentators have theorized that, based on obvious limitations, preissuance protests are rare. 
See Janis, supra note 41, at 16. 
 55. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(c) (2006). 
 56. See Changes To Implement Eighteen-Month Publication of Patent Applications, 65 
Fed. Reg. at 57,056. 
 57. Third-Party Submission in Published Application, 37 C.F.R. § 1.99 (2011). Rule 99 has 
since been repealed and reserved. See Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submission by 
Third Parties Provision of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,150, 42,173 
(July 15, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.99). 
 58. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.99(b)(1) (requiring inclusion of “[t]he fee set forth in [37 C.F.R.] 
§ 1.17(p)”); cf. 37 C.F.R. § 1.17(p) (requiring a fee of $180). Rule 99 did not limit the number of 
submissions made by any single party, so long as $180 was paid for each ten patents or 
publications. Bradley William Baumeister, Critique of the New Rule 1.99: Third-Party 
Information Disclosure Procedure for Published Pre-Grant Applications, 83 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 381, 406 (2001). 
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considered by an examiner.59 Purportedly keeping in line with 
§ 122(c), the rule barred third parties from including with their 
submitted patents or publications any explanation or other 
information.60 It was, therefore, left to the examiner to determine 
how, if at all, the submitted prior art was relevant to the pending 
application. 
In its continuing quest to minimize the issuance of invalid 
patents,61 the Office justified its rulemaking as necessary to “improve 
the quality of examination.”62 Because examiners’ increased exposure 
to relevant prior art should lead to more effective examination, the 
goal of Rule 99 was to harness the collective knowledge of the public 
to bring that art to the attention of the Office, and ultimately, to 
foster the issuance of only valid patents.63 
It is not obvious how Rule 99 can be reconciled with the 
apparent congressional intent to restrict third-party involvement in 
patent prosecution post-publication.64 For instance, the Office appears 
to have drafted Rule 99 using the existing protest procedures as a 
template,65 whereas Congress explicitly banned the use of protests 
post-publication.66 Further, § 122(c)’s prohibition of any “other form 
of pre-issuance opposition”67 suggests that Congress may have 
intended a sweeping ban on third-party involvement. Under such an 
interpretation of § 122(c), “any form of a complaint, objection, or 
display of unwillingness to an idea or course of action whatsoever” 
would be included in the terms “protest” and “opposition.”68 As one 
commentator reasoned, 
 
 59. 37 C.F.R. § 1.99(d). 
 60. Id. 
 61. The Office’s protest procedure was justified on the same grounds. See Patent 
Examining and Appeal Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 5588, 5589 (Jan. 28, 1977) (codified as 
amended at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 62. Changes To Implement Eighteen-Month Publication of Patent Applications, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 57,024, 57,043 (Sept. 20, 2000) (codified as amended at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 63. See id.; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF 
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1134.01 (8th ed., rev. 9, 2012) (explaining that the Office 
allows the public to submit prior art “which [it] would discover on its own with an 
ideal . . . search” to carry out its responsibility to issue only valid patents).  
 64. Cf. Baumeister, supra note 58, at 387 (“To stem any potential tide of post-publication 
protest harassment by third parties, Congress included [§ 122(c)] within . . . the AIPA.”). 
 65. See id. at 388 (noting the nearly identical form and language between Rule 99 and Rule 
291 as of 2001). 
 66. 35 U.S.C. § 122(c) (2006). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Baumeister, supra note 58, at 391. 
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[S]ince the third party’s ultimate purpose of filing a [Rule 99] 
submission is to provide the examiner with a prior art reference that 
will tend to negate the patentability of the application’s claims, the 
submission of any reference, even without the inclusion of additional 
explanations or commentary, would itself inherently constitute a 
complaint or objection to the granting of a patent on the application. 
Thus, any submission of relevant prior art per se rises to the level of 
a protest or opposition.69 
In response to a comment raising these objections during 
rulemaking, the Office announced that it would not adopt such a 
broad interpretation of § 122(c),70 but instead argued that “[a] 
submission under [Rule 99] . . . is different from either an ‘opposition’ 
proceeding or a ‘protest’ that would fall under [that] provision[].”71 
The Office interpreted “opposition” not as it is commonly used by the 
ordinary person, but rather as a specialized term of art, defined by 
existing “opposition” procedures in the trademark realm and in 
practice at foreign patent offices.72 Oppositions of this sort are 
described as “complex” in nature, involving “full adversarial 
proceedings similar to a trial, complete with pleadings, notice, 
discovery, stipulations, motions, briefs, evidence, and opportunity for 
oral argument.”73 Because the Office likened oppositions to inter 
partes civil actions, the relatively detached nature of Rule 99 
submissions rendered the two procedures easily distinguishable.74 
However, the mere fact that Rule 99 submissions were neither 
complex nor involved did not alone clear them of the restrictions set 
forth in § 122(c). Section 122(c) refers explicitly to protests,75 which 
do not fall under the Office’s interpretation of “opposition.”76 
Undeterred, the Office argued that “a third-party submission of 
patents and publications under [Rule 99 was] not a ‘protest.’”77 In 
contrast to its treatment of the word “opposition,” the Office 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Changes To Implement Eighteen-Month Publication of Patent Applications, 65 
Fed. Reg. 57,024, 57,042 (Sept. 20, 2000) (codified as amended at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id.  
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. 
 75. 35 U.S.C. § 122(c) (2006).  
 76. For a description of the ex parte nature of protests, see supra notes 38–39. 
 77. Changes To Implement Eighteen-Month Publication of Patent Applications, 65 Fed. 
Reg. at 57,042. 
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interpreted “protest” based on that word’s definition as it is 
“generally understood.”78 Consulting a dictionary, the Office defined 
a protest as “a complaint, objection, or display of unwillingness 
usually to an idea or course of action.”79 The Office adopted a 
formalistic interpretation of “complaint or objection,” arguing that a 
Rule 99 submission did not amount to either for two reasons. First, 
the Office argued that the rule did not allow the submissions to 
contain any form of adversarial arguments—only the prior art 
documents themselves were permitted.80 Second, the Office argued 
that “patents and publications [could have been] submitted for 
various reasons,” not only by a person filing with the intention to foil 
the application’s success.81 
The Office also contrasted Rule 99 submissions with the existing 
protest procedures.82 The Office argued that unlike a protest under 
Rule 291, a Rule 99 submission “does not permit the third party to 
transmit any commentary or adversarial arguments objecting to a 
patent application.”83 The Office also argued that the two procedures 
were different because Rule 99 allowed only for submission of prior 
art patents and publications,84 whereas Rule 291 protests allowed 
submissions of any information related to a pending application’s 
patentability.85 
Finally, the Office considered § 122(c) as a whole and interpreted 
it “to mean that the Office is to ensure that no third party is given the 
ability (or right) to have input on the examination of the application 
after publication and argue against the application’s patentability.”86 
It argued that to conform to § 122(c), Rule 99 would “ensure that no 
third parties enter written, adversarial arguments, thereby coloring 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. See id. (citing MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 938 (10th ed. 1993)). 
 80. Id. 
 81. See id. (“Individuals may wish to submit patents or publications to help the examiner 
understand the technology or the appropriate field of search.”). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See id. (“Only patents and publications (i.e., prior art documents that are public 
information that are theoretically available to the examiner and which the Office would 
discover on its own in an ideal world) may be supplied to the examiner in a submission under 
[Rule 99].”). 
 85. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.291(c) (2012) (“[A] protest must include . . . [a] copy of each listed 
patent, publication, or other item of information . . . .”) (emphasis added).  
 86. Changes To Implement Eighteen-Month Publication of Patent Applications, 65 Fed. 
Reg. at 57,043. 
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the ex parte process.”87 To that end, the Office even refused to permit 
third parties to mark or otherwise highlight their submitted prior-art 
documents.88 
Despite the Office’s goal to provide for greater involvement by 
third parties,89 the public likely never embraced Rule 99 submissions 
to any great extent for several reasons.90 First, Rule 99 limited the 
window of opportunity for third parties to submit prior art to only 
two months following the application’s publication.91 Such a narrow 
time frame required third parties to remain highly vigilant of Office 
publications. 
Second, Rule 99’s prohibition of accompanying explanatory 
material92 also weakened the procedure’s appeal. Prior-art documents 
submitted pursuant to Rule 99 were entered into the patent 
application’s permanent file.93 In general, if a patentee is successful 
during examination and ultimately obtains a patent, the patent “shall 
be presumed valid” during subsequent litigation.94 Further, “a patent 
is presumed to have overcome any references introduced during its 
examination.”95 Therefore, any prior art submitted under Rule 99 
instantly lost some of its potential to invalidate the patent in future 
litigation.96  
Unlike during litigation, Rule 99 submitters were not allowed to 
attach any commentary to their prior art, and therefore, submitters 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Baumeister, supra note 58, at 400. Third parties could, however, submit redacted 
versions of prior art documents, effectively highlighting the most relevant parts. See Changes To 
Implement Eighteen-Month Publication of Patent Applications, 65 Fed. Reg. at 57,043. At least 
one commentator has argued that there is little, if any, distinction between highlights or 
markings for the purpose of emphasis and redacted copies, and that such a broad interpretation 
of § 122(c) “would cast upon the legitimacy of Rule 99 in toto.” See Baumeister, supra note 58, 
at 401 (“The only real reason a third party would file a [Rule 99] submission at all is exactly the 
same as the reason for highlighting the references contained therein: to inform the examiner of 
particular disclosures that cast doubt upon the validity of a given application’s claims.”). 
 89. See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text.  
 90. See Matthew John Duane, Lending A Hand: The Need for Public Participation in 
Patent Examination and Beyond, 7 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 57, 63 (2008). As with data on 
protests, the Office did not release statistics on Rule 99 submission rates.  
 91. 37 C.F.R. § 1.99(e) (2011). 
 92. Id. § 1.99(d). 
 93. Id. § 1.99(a). 
 94. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2006). 
 95. Duane, supra note 90, at 63 (citing Gould v. Gen. Photonics Corp., 534 F. Supp. 399, 
400 (N.D. Cal. 1982)). 
 96. Id.  
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risked the possibility that examiners would overlook or misconstrue 
their submission’s relevance to the application.97 Assuming that most 
would-be Rule 99 submitters were competitors of the applicants, they 
were likely not eager to show their cards without supporting 
commentary and, thereby, potentially compromise what might 
otherwise be strong litigation material.98 
Ultimately, Rule 99 was replaced in September 2012 with an 
expanded version of essentially the same rule.99 The following section 
discusses that transition. 
C. Congressional Amendment of § 122(e) 
With the weaknesses of the Rule 99 submissions in mind, some 
commentators proposed that the procedures for preissuance 
submissions should be amended to allow for greater participation by 
third parties.100 Because competitors and otherwise-interested third 
parties collectively constitute a vast resource of knowledge regarding 
prior art, these proposals argued that a mechanism for harnessing that 
resource should better incentivize third-party action.101 
Under one commentator’s proposal, third parties would be 
allowed to submit “all types of information,” not merely prior art.102 
Also, third parties would be allowed to supplement their submissions 
with “a brief statement of relevancy for all information submitted.”103 
Such a proposal would “improve[] the quality of information 
submitted and decrease[] the burden on [the Office] to independently 
establish relevancy.”104 This proposal would also directly address 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. See id.  
 99. See Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties Provision of 
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,150, 42,173 (July 17, 2012) (to be 
codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.290). 
 100. See, e.g., Kevin Mack, Reforming Inequitable Conduct To Improve Patent Quality: 
Cleansing Unclean Hands, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 169–70 (2006); see also FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, supra note 26, at 18 (“Some urged that pre-grant opposition would have the 
advantage of introducing third-party participation before the PTO is on record with a position, 
thereby avoiding any undue tendency to affirm prior acts.”). 
 101. See Mack, supra note 100, at 169. 
 102. Id. at 170. For a list of some hypothetical examples of non-prior-art submissions, see 
infra notes 180–87 and accompanying text. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
TRZECIAK IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 9/18/2013  4:21 PM 
2013] REFORMING PREISSUANCE SUBMISSIONS 259 
submitters’ fears that their submissions would be weakened and 
potentially compromised without the possibility for explanation.105 
Concerns about the underutilization of Rule 99 submissions 
ultimately gained the attention of Congress. On June 8, 2005, 
Representative Lamar Smith introduced the Patent Reform Act of 
2005 (the 2005 Act),106 which included, among other important patent 
reforms,107 an expansion of the ability of third parties to submit prior 
art to pending application files.108 In pertinent part, the 2005 Act 
proposed amending § 122 to allow for anonymous, third-party 
preissuance submissions of patents or publications “of potential 
relevance to the examination of the application” submitted before the 
examiner’s first rejection of that application, but not before six 
months after the application’s publication.109 In its most significant 
departure from Rule 99, the proposed amendment to § 122(e) 
required that third parties include with their submissions “a concise 
description of the asserted relevance of each submitted document.”110 
However, the 2005 Act failed to be enacted.111  
Two years later, proponents of patent reform introduced a 
similar bill, the Patent Reform Act of 2007 (the 2007 Act),112 which 
included a nearly identical preissuance-submissions provision.113 A 
report from the Committee on the Judiciary on the 2007 Act (the 
2007 Committee Report) provided some insight into Congress’s 
rationale for the amendment to § 122(e).114 The 2007 Committee 
Report cited growing concerns about “the quality of issued 
patents . . . in recent years.”115 It noted that “patents have issued on 
 
 105. See supra notes 92–98 and accompanying text. 
 106. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 107. Billed as “without question, the most comprehensive change to U.S. patent law since 
Congress passed the 1952 Patent Act,” the 2005 Act proposed a change of application priority 
from first-to-invent to first-to-file, deleted the “best mode” disclosure requirement, and created 
a new post-grant opposition procedure. Press Release, Congressman Lamar Smith, Smith 
Introduces Patent Reform Bill (June 8, 2005), available at http://web.archive.org/web/
20060927203732/http://lamarsmith.house.gov/News.asp?FormMode=Detail&ID=669. 
 108. H.R. 2795 § 10. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. H.R. 2795 (109th): Patent Act of 2005, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bills/109/hr2795 (last visited Aug. 3, 2013). 
 112. Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 113. See id. § 9. However, the new version also required third parties to “identify the real 
party-in-interest making the submission.” Id. 
 114. H.R. Rep. No. 110-314 (2007). 
 115. Id. at 36–37. 
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inventions that were publically known and in use prior to the filing of 
the applications” especially in “newer areas of technology.”116 In these 
areas, patent examiners have struggled to locate “all of the prior art 
that exists in those fields.”117 To remedy this problem, the drafters 
sought to amend § 122(e) “to allow third parties to submit prior art 
that may be known to the public, but not readily available to the 
examiner.”118 
Importantly, the 2007 Act did not propose to repeal the § 122(c) 
ban on pre-grant protests and oppositions. The 2007 Committee 
Report acknowledged that Rule 99’s limiting conditions on 
submissions (the narrow two-month window of submission 
acceptance and the prohibition on accompanying explanations) were 
designed to comply with § 122(c).119 By amending § 122(e) but 
“leaving § 122(c) intact,” the drafters of the 2007 Act intended to 
“include broader circumstances under which third parties may submit 
prior art in a published application” without “allow[ing] for 
additional third party input that would amount to a protest or pre-
issuance opposition.”120 By requiring submitters to “include an 
explanation of the relevance of the prior art,” the drafters sought 
both “to assist the examiner in focusing on the relevant information” 
and to “reduce the likelihood that a third party [would] submit large 
numbers of irrelevant or cumulative references.”121 Although the 2007 
Act was passed by the House of Representatives on September 7, 
2007, it failed to win the support of the Senate and was ultimately 
abandoned.122  
On January 25, 2011, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced yet 
another iteration of patent reform, the AIA. Finally, both the House 
and the Senate passed their respective versions of this bill, and 
President Barack Obama signed the measure into law on September 
 
 116. Id. The 2007 Committee Report identified software and business method patents as 
those most susceptible to examiner error, in part because “those areas do not have a well-
developed tradition of, or system for, publication in readily searchable printed journals.” Id. at 
37. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id.  
 122. H.R. 1908 (110th): Patent Reform Act of 2007, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bills/110/hr1908 (last visited Aug. 3, 2013). 
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16, 2011.123 The AIA codified the oft-proposed amendment to 
§ 122(e).124 Under the law, “[a]ny third party may submit for 
consideration and inclusion in the record of a patent application, any 
patent, published patent application, or other printed publication of 
potential relevance” before the later of six months from the date the 
application is published or the date of the examiner’s first rejection of 
any claim.125 The law contains no requirement that the submitter 
identify the real party in interest behind the submission and mandates 
that all submissions must “set forth a concise description of the 
asserted relevance of each submitted document.”126 
D. The Office Promulgates Rule 290 Pursuant to Amended § 122(e) 
On July 17, 2012, the Office abandoned Rule 99 and 
promulgated a new regulation providing for preissuance submissions 
by third parties pursuant to the AIA.127 New 37 C.F.R. § 1.290 (Rule 
290), titled “[s]ubmissions by third parties in applications,” went into 
effect on September 16, 2012, and “appl[ies] to any application filed 
before, on, or after” that date.128 
The Office embraced the new changes set forth in the AIA as an 
opportunity to broadly expand upon the ability of third parties to 
assist patent examiners during an examination in three ways.129 First, 
the Office interpreted § 122(e) to allow third parties to submit almost 
any printed publications to the examination of an application, not just 
those that are prior art.130 Amended § 122(e) provides, “[a]ny third 
 
 123. See H.R. 1249 (112th): Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, GOVTRACK.US, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr1249 (last visited Aug. 3, 2013) (noting that the 
House version of the Act passed on June 23, 2011); S. 23 (112th): America Invents Act, 
GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s23 (last visited Aug. 3, 2013) (noting 
that the Senate version of the Act passed on March 8, 2011). 
 124. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 8, 125 Stat. 284, 315 (2011) (to 
be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 122(e)).  
 125. Id. (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 122(e)(1)). 
 126. See id. (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 122(e)(2)(A)). 
 127. Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties Provision of the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,150, 42,173 (July 17, 2012) (to be codified at 
37 C.F.R. § 1.290). 
 128. Id. at 42,150. 
 129. Perhaps the Office’s new rule has impermissibly surpassed the intent of Congress with 
respect to both § 122(e) and § 122(c). See infra Part II. 
 130. See Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties Provision of 
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 42,154. (“Because . . . § 122(e) does not 
limit the type of information that may be submitted to only that which is prior art, there is no 
requirement in [Rule 290] that the information submitted be prior art . . . .”). 
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party may submit . . . any patent, published patent application, or 
other printed publication of potential relevance to the examination of 
the application.”131 To that end, Rule 290 merely requires that the 
documents qualify as “printed publications” under the definition set 
forth in § 2128 of the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure 
(MPEP).132 According to the MPEP, a “printed publication” is 
broadly defined as any reference that “is accessible to the public.”133 
However, to weed out any “improper attempt by the third party to 
impermissibly participate in the examination of the application,” the 
Office cautioned that submitted documents that appear to have been 
“drafted after the application was filed solely to contest patentability” 
may not be accepted.134 
Second, pursuant to amended § 122(e),135 Rule 290 requires third 
parties to provide a “concise description of the asserted relevance of 
each item” submitted.136 These descriptions are required to contain at 
least some substance: Rule 290 provides that, “[a]t a minimum, [the 
description] must be more than a bare statement that the document is 
relevant” and that it instead must be “meaningful.”137 By contrast, 
under Rule 99, third parties were prohibited from including any 
markings or explanations on their submitted documents.138 Therefore, 
even if third parties had been allowed to submit non-prior-art 
documents under that rule, those submissions likely would have been 
ambiguous or otherwise unhelpful to examiners without any 
clarification.139 
Under Rule 290, however, even vague submissions of any variety 
become much more powerful now that submitters are able to assert 
 
 131. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 8, 125 Stat. at 316 (to be 
codified at 35 U.S.C. § 122(e)). 
 132. Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties Provision of the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 42,154 (citing U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, supra note 63, § 2128). 
 133. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 63, § 2128. 
 134. See Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties Provision of 
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 42,163. 
 135. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 8, 125 Stat. at 316 (to be 
codified at 35 U.S.C. § 122(e)). 
 136. Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties Provision of the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 42,173. 
 137. Id. at 42,156. 
 138. See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text. 
 139. In such a case, examiners would be left guessing to where in the often many-page 
application the submitter is referring. 
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an association between the submission and a specific part of the 
application. The Office has stated that it is interpreting the concise 
description-of-relevance requirement “liberally because [it] 
anticipates that third parties will be motivated to . . . effectively draw 
the examiner’s attention to the potential relevance of a submitted 
document.”140 Rule 290 suggests that “a narrative description or a 
claim chart,” in which various portions of a submitted document are 
“mapped”—or assigned—to different claim elements in the 
application, would be acceptable.141 
Third, Rule 290 expands upon the ability of third parties to assist 
patent examiners by reducing submission cost barriers. While the 
Office had previously charged third parties a processing fee for 
submitted documents under Rule 99,142 Rule 290 retains the old fee 
structure but provides an exemption for the first three documents 
submitted by any party (or a party in privity with that party) in any 
given application.143 The Office reasoned that the “submission of a 
limited number of documents is more likely to assist in the 
examination process and thus offset the cost of processing the 
submission.”144 Even if the $180 processing fee had not been a major 
deterrent for competitive submitters under Rule 99, this fee waiver 
should make Rule 290 a viable procedure for disinterested third 
parties, such as students, who otherwise might not be inclined to 
spend more than their time assisting in patent examination.145 
In sum, Rule 290 replaces Rule 99 with a much more attractive 
procedure for third parties to cheaply and anonymously146 submit any 
published documents relevant to an invention’s patentability.147 
However, despite Rule 290’s benefits, its expansive nature leads it to 
conflict with the § 122(c) ban on preissuance opposition, making 
further change necessary to eliminate the tension between § 122(c) 
 
 140. Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties Provision of the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 42,156 (emphasis added). 
 141. Id. 
 142. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text. 
 143. Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties Provision of the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 42,153. 
 144. Id. 
 145. For further discussion on disinterested submitters, see infra notes 162–65 and 
accompanying text. 
 146. While the party in interest may remain anonymous, that party’s submitting agent will 
be identified. Rule 290 requires signed statements by the submitter that the submission is in 
compliance with the rule. See id. at 42,154 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.290(d)(5), (g)). 
 147. See id. (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.290). 
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and § 122(e) and to further encourage third-party participation in 
patent prosecution. 
II.  THE PROHIBITION ON PRE-GRANT, THIRD-PARTY ARGUMENTS 
SHOULD BE CURTAILED 
Because Rule 290 went into effect on September 16, 2012,148 time 
will tell whether the new procedure will be more widely embraced 
than its predecessor. Despite the apparent advantages over the old 
system, some commentators are not optimistic that the changes are 
drastic enough to adequately encourage competitive participation.149 
One commentator has simply argued that “even if submission 
practice is improved” over Rule 99, “[t]he small possibility of 
stopping a patent ‘on the cheap’ does not provide much incentive to 
study applications as they are published.”150 
Thus, to address these concerns and foster greater third-party 
participation, Congress should recognize that even the new procedure 
enables enough third-party involvement that it already conflicts with 
§ 122(c)’s prohibition on pre-grant protests and opposition. Congress 
should amend § 122(c) to relieve this tension and permit third parties 
to supplement their submitted references with direct arguments 
explaining how those references render the application unpatentable. 
This way, from the perspective of potential submitters, there is less 
risk that examiners will fail to fully recognize the value of submitted 
references. 
A. Lifting the Ban on Third-Party Preissuance Argumentation Would 
Eliminate the Tension Between § 122(c) and § 122(e). 
As a relatively small provision largely overshadowed by the more 
significant and controversial patent reforms enacted through the 
AIA,151 the “Preissuance Submissions” amendment to § 122(e) has 
not raised many suspicious eyebrows.152 To the contrary, many have 
 
 148. Id. at 42,150. 
 149. See, e.g., Bezos, supra note 22, § 14.39. 
 150. Rochelle Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting: The PTO as Cause or Cure, 104 MICH. L. 
REV. 1559, 1573 (2006). 
 151. The AIA also changes patent awarding priority from first-to-invent to first-to-file, see 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284, 285 (2011), and 
establishes new post-grant opposition proceedings, see id. § 6.  
 152. See James G. McEwen, Is the Cure Worse than the Disease? An Overview of the Patent 
Reform Act of 2005, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 55, 72 (2005) (“Because this 
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applauded the amendment as a step in the right direction for 
improving the quality of issued patents.153 However, this Note argues 
that although the AIA’s allowance of increased third-party 
participation in patent prosecution was sound in policy, it nonetheless 
has led the Office to violate § 122(c)’s overly restrictive ban on 
preissuance opposition. 
1. Even the Office’s Prior Rule 99 Submission Procedure 
Arguably Violated § 122(c).  Rule 290 is merely the latest in a series of 
attempts by the Office to push the boundaries of § 122(c). The Office 
first chipped away at the statutory ban on preissuance opposition by 
establishing the Rule 99 third-party submissions procedure almost 
immediately after Congress enacted § 122(c). At that time, the Office 
argued that Rule 99 submissions did not violate § 122(c) because the 
submissions amounted to neither a protest nor an opposition.154 
However, even then the Office may have interpreted § 122(c) too 
narrowly for two reasons. 
First, the Office argued that § 122(c)’s ban on “protest[s] or other 
form[s] of pre-issuance opposition”155 applied only to “protest[s]” and 
“opposition[s]” as they are separately understood in the patent 
industry.156 The Office defined an “opposition” narrowly as a 
complex, inter partes procedure similar to civil litigation in federal 
court.157 However, § 122(c) explicitly bars any “protest or other form 
of pre-issuance opposition,”158 indicating that protests are intended to 
be an example of preissuance opposition.159 Because a protest allows 
only very limited third-party participation, it cannot be characterized 
 
improvement in patent quality is a generally acknowledged goal, this passage has not generated 
a great deal of controversy.”). 
 153. See id.; Dylan M. Aste, To Disclose or Not To Disclose: Why the United States Properly 
Adopted the European Model for Third-Party Participation During Patent Prosecution, 3 CASE 
W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 153, 181–85 (2012) (arguing that increased third-party 
participation in patent prosecution should result in fewer invalid patents, less litigation, and 
stronger patent applications). 
 154. See supra notes 70–88 and accompanying text. 
 155. 35 U.S.C. § 122(c) (2006). 
 156. See supra notes 70–88 and accompanying text. 
 157. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text. 
 158. 35 U.S.C. § 122(c) (emphasis added). 
 159. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUES AND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:17 (7th ed. 2007) (“Where general words follow specific 
words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects 
similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.” (citations 
omitted)). 
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as a complex opposition procedure of the type described by the 
Office.160 Therefore, § 122(c) should be interpreted to ban post-
publication, preissuance protests and other third-party antagonism 
that resembles a protest. Especially because the format and language 
of Rule 99 strongly resemble those of Rule 291 protests,161 it is 
possible that Rule 99 would have been invalid under this 
interpretation. 
Second, the Office’s argument that Rule 99 submissions were not 
antagonistic in nature because the “patents and publications [could 
have been] submitted for various reasons”162 is unpersuasive. The 
Office postulated that “[i]ndividuals may wish to submit patents or 
publications to help the examiner understand the technology or the 
appropriate field of search.”163 Although there exist no available 
statistics on the use of Rule 99, there is indeed evidence supporting 
the prediction that some disinterested third parties are willing to track 
applications and submit prior art. For instance, in 2007, the Center for 
Patent Innovations at New York Law School began a two-year Peer 
To Patent pilot program, providing an Internet forum for third parties 
to discuss and collectively submit publications to select pending 
applications.164 The pilot program attracted 2,800 participant 
reviewers, 686 of whom became “active” on the site.165 Of those active 
reviewers, 108 identified their interest in participating as either 
“[p]ersonal,” “[c]ontributing to the issuance of quality patents,” or 
“[contributing] to patent reform.”166 While a plurality identified their 
interests as “[p]rofessional,” only three active reviewers explicitly 
stated that they were primarily motivated by “[c]ompetitive 
interests.”167 
The success of the Peer To Patent pilot program demonstrated 
that some third parties are sufficiently motivated to monitor and 
engage new applications without a direct financial interest in the 
 
 160. For a description of the ex parte nature of protests, see supra notes 38–39 and 
accompanying text. 
 161. Baumeister, supra note 58, at 388. 
 162. Changes To Implement Eighteen-Month Publication of Patent Applications, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 57,024, 57,042 (Sept. 20, 2000) (codified as amended at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 163. Id. 
 164. CTR. FOR PATENT INNOVATIONS, N.Y. LAW SCH., PEER TO PATENT: FIRST PILOT 
FINAL RESULTS 4–5 (2012), available at http://dl.dropbox.com/u/2541719/First%20Pilot%
20Final%20Results.pdf. 
 165. Id. at 24. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
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outcome. However, although many third parties will likely continue 
to participate using the now-effective Rule 290, it seems intuitive that 
financially interested parties will consititute a greater portion of the 
participants now that the procedure is permanent.168 Also, even those 
submitters whose motivations are purely altruistic typically will be 
adverse to the applicant.169 Because a patent confers upon its owner 
an economic monopoly, both competitors and the public at large 
benefit from, and are motivated to ensure, appropriately narrow 
patents.170 
2. The Inconsistent Application of § 122(c) To Ban Protests but 
Not Preissuance Submissions Is Unprincipled.  Although the Office 
arguably transgressed § 122(c) by adopting Rule 99, it firmly asserted 
at that time that a submission would violate that statute if the 
submission included any non-prior-art references or contained any 
explanation.171 But in 2011, Congress tossed the Office into an 
impossible interpretive quagmire when it amended § 122(e) and 
allowed third-party submissions of any publications and 
accompanying descriptions of relevance.172 Tasked with promulgating 
a rule that directly violated even its narrow interpretation of § 122(c), 
the Office was left splitting hairs in carving out Rule 290 preissuance 
submissions from the ban on protests. The Office directly addressed 
 
 168. The majority of the listed motivations of Peer To Patent active participants, including 
those most frequently self-reported (“Professional” and “Contributing to the issuance of quality 
patents”), see id., are notably ambiguous regarding financial interest. Further, some less 
ambiguously altruistic interests (“Contribute to patent reform” and “Ensure long-term 
commitment from [the Office] for public participation”), see id., are arguably less applicable 
now that the sought reform—the amendment to § 122(e) and a robust Rule 290—has been 
achieved. See id. at 33 (describing the then-pending legislation as a plausible means to reward 
only meritorious patents “as illustrated by the success of Peer To Patent”). 
 169. Because “[a] person shall be entitled to a patent unless” the invention has been 
disclosed in the prior art, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006), there is virtually no submission of prior art that 
can aid an applicant in obtaining a patent for his originally filed claims. Even submissions that 
serve only to direct an examiner to the appropriate field of search will have played an 
antagonistic role if the examiner’s search leads to invalidating prior art. There is one small 
exception, however. Prior art references that “teach away,” or suggest that the claimed 
invention is impractical or implausible, may be used to rebut a prima facie showing that the 
invention is obvious. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 63, § 2145(X)(D). 
 170. Thomas Jefferson, administrator of the early U.S. patent system, viewed patent 
monopolies as an evil necessary to incentivize innovation. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 
1, 7–11 (1966). Jefferson sought to ensure that only inventions that “were new and useful” 
received “the special inducement of a limited monopoly.” Id. at 9. 
 171. See supra notes 82–88 and accompanying text. 
 172. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 8, 125 Stat. 284, 315–16 (2011) 
(to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 122(e)). 
TRZECIAK IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 9/18/2013  4:21 PM 
268 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:245 
this issue during rulemaking with three main arguments in response 
to comments questioning the overlap between protests and Rule 290 
submissions.173 
First, the Office argued that, although Rule 290 was created 
pursuant to § 122(e), protests are “supported by a separate statutory 
provision, [§ 122(c)], which implies the availability of submitting a 
protest in an application prior to publication.”174 This argument is 
misleading because the Office invented the protest procedure in 
1977,175 long before § 122(c) was codified in 1999.176 Thus, § 122(c) 
does not “support” protests, but rather it limits them to the pre-
publication time period—just as it limits any other procedure that 
amounts to preissuance opposition, arguably including Rule 290.177 
Second, the Office reasoned that unlike Rule 290 submissions, 
protests permit “the submission of information other than 
publications, including any facts or information adverse to 
patentability.”178 However, the Office’s liberal interpretation of 
“printed publications” under Rule 290 minimizes this distinction 
between protests and submissions.179 The Office suggested that Rule 
290 submissions “could include litigation papers and court documents 
 
 173. See Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submission by Third Parties Provision of 
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,150, 42,151 (July 17, 2012) (to be 
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 174. Id. 
 175. See Patent Examining and Appeal Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 5588, 5589 (Jan. 28, 1977) 
(codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) (establishing the protest). 
 176. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, tit. IV, 113 Stat. 1501, 
1501A-552 (1999) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 122). Admittedly, § 122 does distinguish 
between protests and preissuance submissions by name, though it is silent on the material 
differences between them. 
 177. One could argue that § 122(e) preissuance submissions are also restricted by § 122(c), 
and therefore, that Congress intended those submissions be allowed only when the submitter 
had received the express consent of the applicant. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(c) (mandating that post-
publication opposition is not allowed “without the express written consent of the applicant”). 
While this interpretation is not a strong one, § 122(c) probably would still prohibit a 
hypothetical opposition rulemaking that is only thinly veiled as pursuant to § 122(e). See 
Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submission by Third Parties Provision of the Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 42,156 (“[Rule 290] should not be interpreted as 
permitting a third party to participate in the prosecution of an application, as [§ 122(c)] 
prohibits the initiation of a protest or other form of pre-issuance opposition . . . .”). 
 178. Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submission by Third Parties Provision of the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 42,151. For example, one might submit a 
protest containing documents that are not publically available or were created solely to contest 
patentability. 
 179. See supra notes 130–34 and accompanying text. 
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not subject to a court-imposed protective or secrecy order.”180 Such an 
expansive definition of admissible “printed publications” allows a 
savvy third party to raise any objection to a pending application’s 
patentability.181 For example, one could submit a page of a dictionary 
if one believes a term in the application’s claims is indefinite.182 One 
could submit a copy of the landmark Federal Circuit case, In re 
Wands,183 to suggest that the application’s specification would not 
enable a person skilled in the art to use the invention.184 Or, one could 
submit a patent examiner’s rejection memo found in a similar 
application file185 if one believed the instant application could be 
rejected on analogous grounds. Taken to the limits of what is 
acceptable, one could submit even relevant sections of either the 
MPEP186 or the U.S. Code187 pertaining to patent-validity 
requirements. 
Also, the new rule does allow submissions of some information in 
addition to the information contained in the references. Rule 290 
allows parties to submit “documents that are cumulative of each 
other” because “the description of relevance may provide additional 
information with respect to the document such that the submission [as 
a whole] is not cumulative of information already of record.”188 
 
 180. See Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties Provision of 
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 42,154. 
 181. Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, Pre-Issuance Submissions, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 15, 
2012, 10:30 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/09/pre-issuance-submissions.html. 
 182. See id. Indefiniteness is grounds for claim rejection. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2006) 
(“The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and 
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the 
invention.”). 
 183. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988).  
 184. See id. at 737 (providing a litany of factors for courts and examiners to consider when 
deciding whether the application satisfies the enablement requirement). Insufficient enablement 
is another ground for rejection. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2006). 
 185. Correspondence between examiners and applicants, including examiner rejection 
memos, are published online at the Office’s website in its “Patent Application Information 
Retrieval” database, the same location where the Office publishes new applications. See U.S. 
Patent & Trademark Office, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, PAIR Resources, USPTO.GOV, 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/process/status/private_pair/index.jsp (last visited Aug. 3, 2013).  
 186. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 63, §§ 2103–2190 (providing an 
examiner’s guide to patentability rejections). 
 187. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112 (constituting the statutory bases underlying the many 
patent validity criteria). 
 188. Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submission by Third Parties Provision of the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,150, 42,154–55 (July 17, 2012) (to be 
codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.290). 
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Therefore, if the same submitted publication can have a different 
impact on an application’s patentability depending only on its 
description of relevance, then that description must carry at least 
some weight as substantive information. 
Third and principally, the Office argued that protests are 
different from Rule 290 submissions because protests allow for 
arguments against patentability.189 Rule 290 submissions, on the other 
hand, do not allow third parties to “propose rejections of the claims 
or set forth arguments.”190 Highlighting the distinction in the 
regulations, the Office noted that protests require a “concise 
explanation of the relevance” of submitted references whereas Rule 
290 requires a “concise description of the asserted relevance.”191  
This relatively insignificant difference in regulatory language 
should not be relied upon as the divergence between the two 
procedures. In fact, the Office itself once supported this view; in its 
notice of proposed rulemaking for Rule 290,192 the Office originally 
planned to amend the Rule 291 protest language “to change 
‘explanation’ to ‘description’ to conform to proposed” Rule 290.193 
The Office proposed that such an amendment “would clarify that 
there is no difference between the concise description of relevance for 
a third-party preissuance submission and the concise description of 
relevance for a protest.”194 Only after comments suggested that this 
proposed amendment caused “some confusion” did the Office adopt 
its current position that the two are different.195 
Despite its change of course with respect to the finalized 
formulation of Rule 290, the Office struggled to remain consistent in 
its distinction between an explanation and a description. For example, 
Rule 290 states that the concise description should “explain to the 
examiner the relevance of the document.”196 Additionally, the Office 
was not alone in conflating the words “description” and 
 
 189. Id. at 42,151. 
 190. Id. at 42,156. 
 191. Id. at 42,151 (emphases added). 
 192. Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submission by Third Parties Provision of the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 448 (proposed Jan. 5, 2012) (to be codified at 
37 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 193. Id. at 454 (emphasis added). 
 194. Id. (emphasis added). 
 195. Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submission by Third Parties Provision of the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 42,151. 
 196. Id. at 42,156. 
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“explanation.” Reporting on the proposed 2007 Act, which similarly 
provided that third parties must “set forth a concise description of the 
asserted relevance of each submitted document,”197 the Committee on 
the Judiciary wrote that each submitted document must “include an 
explanation of [its] relevance.”198 Clarifying further, the Committee 
Report stated, “[T]he submitter must explain how the reference 
pertains to the invention claimed in the published application.”199 
While defenders might consider the distinction in regulatory 
language between descriptions and explanations to be merely 
symbolic of underlying substantive differences, there are at least three 
reasons why Rule 290 submissions may amount to rejection proposals 
or other arguments against patentability. First, for example, consider 
the Office’s suggestion that a description of relevance could include a 
claim chart mapping the submitted publication to specific claims in 
the application.200 The Office cautioned that Rule 290 “is not an 
invitation . . . to propose rejections.”201 But if a third party submits a 
prior-art reference and connects it to a specific claim in the pending 
application, that party is, for all practical purposes, proposing a prior-
art-based rejection of that claim. 
Second, a concise description of relevance can function as an 
argument against patentability. As one federal judge interpreted the 
nearly identical proposed preissuance submission language in the 
2005 Act, the procedure “giv[es] a chance for the person who submits 
the pre-issuance submission to give his or her written argument as to 
its relevance.”202 Further, the Office has recognized that “a third party 
might assert that a particular [submitted] document is prior art.”203 In 
fact, the Office requires that concise descriptions comprise more than 
mere highlights, annotations, or form paragraphs.204 Thus, parties 
must describe with detail the relevance of each submitted document 
such that each description inevitably amounts to an argument. 
 
 197. Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 9 (2007) (emphasis added). 
 198. H.R. Rep. No.110-314, at 36–37 (2007) (emphasis added). 
 199. Id. (emphasis added). 
 200. See Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submission by Third Parties Provision of 
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 42,156. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Robert M.M. Seto, A Federal Judge’s View of the Most Important Changes in Patent 
Law in Half-A-Century, 11 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 141, 175 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 203. Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submission by Third Parties Provision of the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 42,163 (emphasis added). 
 204. See id. at 42,164. 
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It follows that an argument as to a document’s relevance to a 
pending application is equivalently an argument as to how the 
document bears on the application’s patentability. Because any 
document that bears on patentability necessarily either supports or 
opposes the application, it is not difficult to extend the logical chain 
one link further and equate the submission and description as a whole 
with an indirect argument simply supporting or opposing 
patentability. 
It is telling that the Office has not capped the acceptable length 
of a concise description205 but has vaguely warned that those 
“approach[ing] the length of the [submitted publications] themselves 
will not likely be considered ‘concise.’”206 In fact, the statutory term 
“concise” has been rendered almost meaningless in at least one other 
area of administrative law. The Administrative Procedure Act207 
requires that agencies promulgating final rules—for example, the 
Office’s Rule 290—“incorporate . . . a concise general statement of 
[the rules’] basis and purpose.”208 Despite the qualifier of “concise,” 
the strict judicial doctrine of hard look review for agency rulemaking 
has led agencies to be “detailed and encyclopedic” in their 
statements, which sometimes reach hundreds of pages in length.209 As 
an example, the Office’s Rule 290 statement is composed of roughly 
28,000 words.210 Therefore, if third parties are similarly given 
substantial leeway with the length of their concise descriptions of 
relevance, they could provide detailed arguments to patent 
examiners. 
Third, some newly permissible types of submitted publications 
may themselves include arguments of the sort prohibited in their 
accompanying descriptions of relevance. The Office largely 
anticipated this issue by warning against the submission of printed 
publications that were published solely to contest a particular patent 
 
 205. See id. (“[W]hile third parties should refrain from submitting verbose descriptions of 
relevance, . . . the Office has not established an upper limit on the size of a concise description at 
this time.”). 
 206. Id. at 42,156. 
 207. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006). 
 208. Id. § 553(c). 
 209. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking Ossification Is Real: A Response to Testing the 
Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1493, 1500 (2012). 
 210. See generally Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submission by Third Parties 
Provision of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,150. 
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application.211 However, some publications falling outside the scope of 
that exception may contain relevant arguments and thus might be 
used strategically to that effect. For example, the patent-validity 
arguments in published litigation briefs or examiner rejection memos 
that address inventions similar to those under review might be 
applicable to the instant applications. Or, query the admissibility of a 
printed publication that was purportedly created for multiple 
purposes—for instance, a hypothetical publication that uses a pending 
application as a case study within a larger work lamenting poor claim 
drafting. The current rule leads to a strange result: the permissibility 
of argumentative publications depends only on the timing and 
purpose of publication. 
B. Lifting the Ban Would Serve the Policy Objectives Underlying 
§ 122(e) Without Causing Harassment or Delay to Applicants. 
To be sure, significant differences remain between protests and 
preissuance submissions. While Rule 290 submissions may often rise 
to the level of argumentation and thus violate § 122(c), the 
submissions cannot be nearly as argumentative as protests. Pursuant 
to Rule 290, third parties must couch their arguments against 
patentability either as arguments as to the relevance of submitted 
publications or through other indirect and crafty means.212 Once they 
have provided a statement of relevance, submitters must rely upon 
the examiner to independently derive direct arguments against 
patentability from each submission. Knowing that an issued patent is 
presumed to have overcome any prior art known to the examiner, 
many competitors may remain reluctant to submit anything,213 
especially when they are prohibited from providing their own direct 
arguments against patentability. Therefore, a legislative relaxation of 
this prohibition likely would better incentivize competitor 
 
 211. Id. at 42,163. 
 212. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 213. See Bezos, supra note 22, § 14:39 (noting that potential submitters may choose to avoid 
the risk of hampering future litigation by “gold plating” patent applications with their 
submissions); Timothy Bechen & Alison McGeary, Changes in Pre-Grant and Post-Grant 
Challenges at the U.S. Patent Office (USPTO), WILLAMS MULLEN (Sept. 15, 2011), 
http://www.williamsmullen.com/news/changes-pre-grant-and-post-grant-challenges-us-patent-
office-uspto (“While [Rule 290] increases the window for, and scope of, third party submissions 
during examination, issues remain as to whether it is advisable to prepare such submissions due 
to the deference that can be given to [the Office] examination and the potential prejudice to 
raising the same prior art in a later proceeding.”).  
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participation, ultimately resulting in the Office’s issuance of fewer 
invalid patents. 
The policy goal motivating § 122(e) was the expansion of 
examiner awareness of prior art that otherwise would be known only 
to a select few.214 Potential increases in disinterested party 
participation notwithstanding, the overarching drawback to Rule 99 
from the perspective of competitors—that art submitted during 
prosecution could be used against submitters during later validity 
proceedings215—remains largely applicable to Rule 290. Accordingly, 
one commentator has predicted: 
[F]or all of the efforts to make the submission process more 
accessible to the public and increase the quality of examination 
through the citation of relevant art, the use of this process will likely 
be significantly limited. The risk of hampering future proceedings by 
essentially “gold plating” a patent that issues from an application 
subjected to the third-party submission process will likely detract 
many potential submitters, or at least make it unlikely that the best 
art will be cited.216 
While these concerns about “gold plating” suggest that 
competitors might never choose to submit prior art regardless of any 
ability to submit direct arguments, these concerns should not be 
overstated. A gold plate is not an estoppel provision. The Federal 
Circuit emphasized this point in 2012 in Sciele Pharma Inc. v. Lupin 
Ltd.217 The court held that during litigation, “there is no heightened or 
added burden that applies to invalidity defenses that are based upon 
references that were before the [Office]. The burden is always the 
same, clear and convincing evidence.”218 Instead, the court reasoned, 
“it may be harder to meet the . . . burden [using] the same argument 
on the same reference that the [Office] already considered.”219 The 
fact of whether evidence had been considered by the Office goes to 
the weight of that evidence during litigation.220 However, district court 
judges are under no legal obligation to instruct juries that the burden 
 
 214. See supra notes 114–18 and accompanying text. 
 215. See supra notes 92–98 and accompanying text. 
 216. Bezos, supra note 22, § 14:39. 
 217. Sciele Pharma Inc. v. Lupin Ltd., 684 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 218. Id. at 1260. 
 219. Id. Despite this heightened practical difficulty, the court resolved the case in the 
defendant’s favor, finding that two prior art references that had been before the Office now 
“raised a substantial question of validity.” Id. at 1261–62. 
 220. Id. at 1260. 
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may be more easily carried when challengers produce references that 
the Office did not consider.221 
Contrast the relatively lax judicial prejudice against examiner-
considered prior art in Lupin with the harsh estoppel provisions 
embedded within the Office’s new post-grant review procedure.222 
Post-grant review, another creation of the AIA,223 is a procedure by 
which third parties may challenge the validity of an issued patent 
within the nine months following its issuance.224 Challengers may 
argue any grounds for invalidity and submit supporting patents, 
publications, and other relevant information to be considered by the 
Director.225 If, based on the submitted evidence, the Director decides 
to institute a review and the Patent Trial and Appeal Board goes on 
to issue a final written decision, the challenger is estopped from 
challenging the same claims in future proceedings or litigation.226 
Thus, not only is the challenger estopped from reusing particular 
prior art references in later challenges, but that party, or any other 
party in privity with that party, is also prohibited from challenging the 
same claims “on any ground that the [challenger] raised or reasonably 
could have raised.”227 As the Federal Circuit in Lupin highlighted, no 
such estoppel surrounds prior art merely because it was previously 
considered by an examiner.228 
Further moderating the futility concerns is evidence that some 
interested parties would be willing to submit prior art to pending 
applications even under the current rules. The Peer To Patent pilot 
program, like current Rule 290, allowed community members to 
review applications and submit prior art to examiners with 
annotations explaining the prior art’s relevance.229 While only three 
 
 221. See Z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 507 F.3d 1340, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding 
that a jury instruction regarding the burden of proof on invalidity might lead to juror confusion). 
 222. Compare Lupin, 685 F.3d at 1260, with Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 
112-29, § 6, 125 Stat. 284, 308 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 325(e)). 
 223. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6, 125 Stat. at 305–11 (2011) 
(to be codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 321–329). 
 224. Id. at 306 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 321). 
 225. Id. at 306, 310 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 321–322, 328). 
 226. Id. at 308 (to be codified at § 325(e)). 
 227. Id. 
 228. See Sciele Pharma Inc. v. Lupin Ltd., 684 F.3d 1253, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“In short, 
there is no heightened or added burden that applies to invalidity defenses that are based upon 
references that were before the . . . Office.”). 
 229. CTR. FOR PATENT INNOVATIONS, supra note 164, at 4–5. In compliance with § 122(c), 
the Peer To Patent pilot program acquired consent from participating applicants. Id. at 4. 
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“active reviewers” identified their interests in participating as 
“[c]ompetitive,” 117 stated their interests were “[p]rofessional.”230 
The top-submitting reviewer, for example, with “124 prior art 
contributions for 82 applications” over the course of the pilot, was a 
software developer working for IBM.231 
Especially in light of the Peer To Patent pilot program’s 
success,232 it is reasonable to predict that allowing submitters to 
provide direct arguments against patentability would further 
incentivize participation. Because parties with competitive interests 
are in an excellent position to provide examiners with the most-
relevant prior art, a boost in their participation would effectively 
carry out the policy goals of § 122(e).233 Further, third parties’ direct 
arguments against patentability could provide examiners with 
potentially strong suggestions that might otherwise be overlooked 
until the patent is challenged in court.234 
Other commentators have previously argued that § 122(c) should 
be amended to provide third parties with greater opportunity to 
participate in prosecution.235 Undoubtedly, Congress has been 
reluctant to take that measure because of widespread fears that third 
parties could then harass applicants or delay prosecution.236 Some 
independent inventors have even expressed concern in the past that 
 
 230. Id. at 24. 
 231. Id. at 30, 37. 
 232. See id. at 24 (“The number of active reviewers nearly doubled in the first two years of 
the pilot, going from 365 to 686.”). 
 233. See supra notes 114–18 and accompanying text. 
 234. Even though examiners are experts in determining patent eligibility, the addition of a 
small adversarial element could help to ensure that time-strapped examiners consider all 
arguments bearing on patentability. Data recently released by the Office shows that the Office 
frequently reverses or adjusts examiner decisions postissuance when “ex parte reexaminations” 
are requested. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING 
DATA - JUNE 30, 2012 1–2, available at http://assets.sbnation.com/assets/1619547/
Ex_parte_reexam_stats.pdf (providing data suggesting that only 22 percent of those patents that 
undergo reexamination emerge with all claims confirmed, and that 92 percent of all requests for 
reexamination are granted). 
 235. See, e.g., Kesan, supra note 44, at 776–83 (noting that the issuance of patents with 
questionable validity “may be ameliorated by adopting an opposition proceeding into the patent 
examination process”); Christopher J. Worrel, Improving the Patent System: Community 
Sourcing and Pre-Grant Opposition, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 833, 858 (2011) (“There is great support 
for utilizing third-party involvement to improve the patent examination process and the patent 
system's overall quality.”). 
 236. See Kesan, supra note 44, at 783 (“Opponents of pre-grant oppositions are correct in 
asserting that pre-grant oppositions provide additional opportunities for delay and 
harassment.”). 
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the now-codified preissuance submissions procedure would lead to 
the same disastrous results.237 In balancing those concerns about 
§ 122(e) preissuance submissions while nevertheless enacting the 
AIA, however, Congress resolved the issue in favor of greater public 
participation. Now, for multiple reasons, another incremental 
amendment permitting submitter arguments against patentability 
would not necessarily induce unfair hardship to applicants. 
First, the presumption of validity for issued patents in light of 
their prosecution histories, though downplayed somewhat by the 
Federal Circuit,238 would continue to moderate submission rates. 
Although competition-driven submitters would be better equipped to 
present their theories of invalidity, and thus would likely be more 
inclined to make submissions, they would still calculate the risk that 
the examiner might find their arguments unpersuasive. 
Second, any opportunities for competitors to harass applicants 
under such an amendment largely exist already under Rule 290. The 
proposed amendment would not necessarily require examiners to 
respond to submissions or even consider them to any greater extent 
than required under the current rules.239 Instead, the sole likely effect 
would be greater competitor confidence that their prior-art 
submissions would be applied to their full potential. Therefore, an 
amendment at this stage would have the greatest impact on those 
competitors with genuine bases for challenging the application, rather 
than on those who only wish to delay prosecution. 
Third, according to the Office’s justification for Rule 290, “Office 
rules already prohibit third parties from purposefully ‘flooding’ an 
application . . . to cause unnecessary delay.”240 Submitters are subject 
to 37 C.F.R. § 11.18(b)(2)(i),241 which requires parties to certify that 
 
 237. See McEwen, supra note 152, at 72 n.126 (“[I]ndependent inventors have raised 
concerns that [the proposed § 122(e) amendment in the 2005 Act] would allow large 
corporations to ‘endlessly contest’ patent applications.”). 
 238. See supra notes 217–21 and accompanying text. 
 239. Under Rule 290, examiners are merely required to acknowledge in the application 
record that they considered the submitted documents and their accompanying statements of 
relevance. See Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties Provision 
of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,150, 42,153 (July 17, 2012) (to be 
codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.290) (“[E]xaminer consideration of a document and its accompanying 
concise description of relevance in a third-party submission does not mean that the examiner 
agrees with the third party’s position regarding the document, only that the examiner 
considered the publication and its accompanying description.”). 
 240. Id. at 42,162. 
 241. 37 C.F.R. § 11.18(b)(2)(i) (2012). 
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their submissions are “not being presented for any improper purpose, 
such as to harass someone or to cause unnecessary delay or needless 
increase in the cost of any proceeding.”242 
Finally, if Congress were to amend § 122(c) to prohibit only 
formal opposition procedures or any procedure likely to result in 
significant harassment or delay, for example, then the Office could 
impose specific measures to limit the likelihood that argument-
containing submissions would be used for abusive ends.243 For 
instance, to prevent harassment, the Office could limit the numbers of 
protests for each real party in interest.244 Further, it could designate a 
more limited time window for submissions to be filed post 
publication. When an examiner rejects a claim, applicants are already 
granted the ability to subsequently amend their applications to work 
around the rejection and submit them to be reexamined.245 To prevent 
delay and the prospect of endless contest, the Office could extend the 
submission time window only to the date of the first examiner 
rejection. This arrangement would balance the interests of patentees 
with those of competitors by ensuring that applicants have the 
opportunity to make narrowing amendments. In sum, it would be 
both feasible and preferable for Congress to relinquish its ax and 
allow the Office to wield a scalpel to specifically address harassment 
concerns. 
CONCLUSION 
An amendment to § 122(c) allowing the public to supplement 
their preissuance submissions with direct arguments against 
patentability would incentivize those submissions more effectively 
than the current scheme. As a result, the amendment would better 
carry out the long-held policy objective of the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office, harnessing the collective power of the public 
to afford greater resources to examiners in making important 
patentability determinations. Such a change in policy could have the 
 
 242. Id. 
 243. See Kesan, supra note 44, at 783 (“[Harassment] concerns can be addressed by 
procedural devices used to address similar concerns in any litigation or adjudication.”). 
 244. Id. 
 245. See 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2006) (“[I]f after receiving [a notice of rejection], the applicant 
persists in his claim for a patent, with or without amendment, the application shall be 
reexamined.”). 
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impact of reducing the number of invalid patents without 
substantially increasing the risk of harassment and delay. 
From the significant breadth of Rule 290, it appears that the 
Office believes that increased public participation in patent 
examination is sound policy. However, Rule 290 and its underlying 
organic provision, § 122(e), are in irreconcilable tension with 
§ 122(c)’s proscriptions. Although § 122(c) broadly prohibits all pre-
grant protests and any other forms of opposition, Rule 290 
submissions and protests are strikingly similar, and, in any case, Rule 
290 effectively serves as a vehicle for third parties to oppose pending 
applications. 
Congress, therefore, should end the metaphorical game of Taboo 
and amend § 122(c) in a manner that both relieves the legal tension 
and allows third parties to fully explain their submissions. Congress 
should delegate responsibility to the Office to promulgate targeted 
rules to ensure that preissuance submissions with accompanying 
arguments are not abused. 
